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Note 
 
YATES v. UNITED STATES: FLOUNDERING ABOUT IN THE 
CHOPPY WATERS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
LINDSAY DEFRANCESCO∗ 
In Yates v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court analyzed 
18 U.S.C. § 15192 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which prohibits persons from 
“destroy[ing] . . . record[s], document[s], or tangible object[s] with the in-
tent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation.3  Specifically, 
the Court examined the term “tangible object,” as used in Section 1519, in 
order to determine its meaning and resolve ambiguity.  The Yates Court 
considered two possible interpretations of “tangible object”: (1) a narrow 
interpretation, where “tangible object” refers only to objects that can be 
“used to record or preserve information,” or (2) a broad interpretation, 
where “tangible object” refers to any physical object.4  The Court held that 
the narrow interpretation was correct, and therefore concluded that “tangi-
ble object” denoted only objects that can “record or preserve information.”5  
The Court’s judgment was correct due to its accurate interpretation of legis-
lative history and congressional intent, and its use of the canons of con-
struction, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.6  The Court erred, howev-
er, when it inappropriately discussed the rule of lenity to expound upon 
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 1.  135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
 2.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).  
 3.  Id.  Section 1519 subjects whoever “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, co-
vers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent 
to impede, obstruct, or influence [an] investigation” to up to twenty years imprisonment.  Id. (em-
phasis added). 
 4.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079–81.  
 5.  Id. at 1079.  
 6.  See infra Part IV.A.  
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policy concerns related to over-criminalization, and it mistakenly applied 
the canon against surplusage to Section 1512(c)(1) instead of Section 
2232(a).7  Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning did imply that Section 1519 
is only applicable in financial fraud cases.8  This inference may provide 
lower courts with instructive guidelines so as to prevent erroneous applica-
tion of Section 1519 in the future to non-financial fraud cases.9 
I.  THE CASE 
On August 23, 2007, Officer Jones of the Florida Fish and Wildlife 
Conservation Commission boarded the fishing vessel the Miss Katie to en-
sure it was in compliance with federal fishing laws after noticing that it was 
using commercial fishing gear.10  While aboard, Officer Jones observed 
three red grouper that he suspected were shorter than the legally required 
twenty inches, which prompted him to measure the rest of the catch.11  In 
doing so, he discovered that seventy-two fish were, in fact, shorter than 
twenty inches.12  Consequently, Officer Jones placed the undersized fish in 
crates and instructed the captain, John Yates, to leave them undisturbed un-
til the vessel reached port so that they could be seized on shore.13 
When the Miss Katie arrived at port, Officer Jones returned to measure 
Yates’s catch, but found this time that all of the grouper narrowly met the 
twenty-inch legal minimum, which lead him to suspect that Yates replaced 
the small grouper with legal-sized fish after he had departed.14  Consequent-
ly, Officer Jones questioned a Miss Katie crewmember, Thomas Lemons, 
who admitted that Yates had ordered him to throw the undersized fish over-
board and replace them with ones from the rest of the catch that were closer 
to twenty inches.15  The government charged Yates with violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2232(a)16 and 18 U.S.C. § 1519 in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida.17  At the close of the government’s case, Yates 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1074 
(2015).  Officer Jones was deputized as a federal officer and thus had the authority to enforce fed-
eral fishing laws.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. at 1061 n.2 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(d)(2)(ii) (2007)) (requiring that all grouper 
harvested for commercial purposes are a minimum of twenty inches). 
 13.  Yates, 733 F.3d at 1061.  Officer Jones also issued Yates a citation for the undersized fish 
before departing.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 1061–62. 
 16.  18 U.S.C. § 2232 (2012) (prohibiting property destruction where it impairs Government’s 
lawful authority to seize such property). 
 17.  Yates, 733 F.3d at 1062–63.  The trial court found Yates guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1519 for “destroying or concealing a ‘tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or in-
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moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court de-
nied.18  Yates contended Section 1519 was inapplicable because it was “a 
records-keeping statute aimed solely at destruction of records and docu-
ments, and could not be applied . . . where it was fish which were de-
stroyed.”19  The district court rejected Yates’s argument, and instead, ap-
plied the Eleventh Circuit’s broad interpretation of Section 1519.20  
Consequently, it concluded that it was reasonable for a jury to find that a 
fish was a “tangible object” under the statute.21  The jury subsequently con-
victed Mr. Yates of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1519.22 
On appeal, Yates argued that the district court erred in denying his mo-
tion for judgment of acquittal.23  Specifically, Yates asserted that the district 
court erred in convicting him under Section 1519 because a “tangible ob-
ject,” as used in the provision, only applied to objects related to recordkeep-
ing, which fish are not.24  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
jected Yates’s argument and affirmed the district court’s ruling.25  First, the 
court reasoned that Section 1519’s language was unambiguous, making it 
unnecessary to examine its intent or legislative history.26  Second, it deter-
mined that because “tangible object” was not explicitly defined within the 
statute, its plain meaning applied, which the court found “unambiguously 
applies to fish.”27  Finally, the Circuit Court posited that since Section 1519 
was unambiguous, the rule of lenity did not apply.28  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether “tangible object,” as used within 18 
                                                          
fluence’ the government’s investigation into harvesting undersized grouper.”  Id. (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).  The trial court also found Yates guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) 
for “knowingly disposing of undersized fish in order to prevent the government from taking law-
ful custody and control of them.”  Id. at 1062 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012)). 
 18.  Id. at 1063.  With regard to § 2232(a), Yates argued that the fish were not actually under-
sized, but they only appeared undersized because Officer Jones incorrectly measured them with 
their mouths closed, and that if the fish were measured properly, with their mouths open, they 
would have been the requisite twenty inches.  Id.  
 19.  United States v. Yates, No. 2:10–cr–66-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 3444093, at *1–2 (M.D. 
Fla., Aug. 8, 2011). 
 20.  Id. at *1. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Yates, 733 F.3d at 1062–63.  
 23.  Id. at 1063.  
 24.  Id.  Yates also argued on appeal that (1) the rule of lenity should apply because § 1519 is 
ambiguous; (2) the trial court erred in convicting him under §§ 2232(a) and 1519 because it incor-
rectly determined that the grouper were less than twenty inches; and (3) the court mistakenly pro-
hibited him from calling a witness.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 1064. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1592 (9th ed. 2009)) (“defining ‘tangible object’ 
as ‘[h]aving or possessing physical form’”); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
1242 (2d ed. 1985) (“[T]angible—Discernable by the touch; capable of being touched; palpa-
ble.”). 
 28.  Yates, 733 F.3d at 1064.  
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U.S.C. § 1519, referred to any physical object, or referred only to objects 
that can be used to preserve or record information.29 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Supreme Court employs various analytical tools to 
interpret statutes, which have developed over time into instructive mecha-
nisms of statutory construction.30  Part II.A of this Note discusses how the 
Court examines plain meaning and context to interpret statutes.  Part II.B 
discusses the Court’s diverging perspectives as to whether legislative histo-
ry should be analyzed when construing statutes, and at what point it should 
be utilized during the process of statutory interpretation.  Part II.C illus-
trates the Court’s application of the rule of lenity.  Part II.D provides back-
ground on (1) the Enron accounting fraud scandal that prompted Congress 
to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (2) the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1519, and (3) how Section 1519 has thus far been interpreted and applied 
by lower courts. 
A.  The United States Supreme Court Uses Tools of Statutory 
Interpretation to Determine Whether a Statute’s Language Is 
Ambiguous and to Resolve Apparent Ambiguity 
Traditionally, the Court proceeds through the process of statutory in-
terpretation in a systematic manner.  First, it will assess whether a statute’s 
“plain meaning” is clear, that is, whether the language of a statute is unam-
biguous and understandable.31  If the Court determines that the language is 
unequivocal, it will end its statutory interpretation analysis and adhere to 
the provision’s text as it is written.32  However, if the Court determines that 
the text is unclear, it will use other tools of statutory construction to resolve 
the ambiguity.33  The Court has also employed an alternative method of 
statutory interpretation, however, wherein it construes a provision by simul-
taneously assessing plain meaning and other mechanisms of statutory inter-
pretation because an examination of plain meaning in isolation is never dis-
                                                          
 29.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
 30.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 31.  See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1998) (initially assessing the 
plain meaning of “carry” to determine the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); see also United States 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (explaining that a statute’s text is the most 
“persuasive evidence” a court may use to resolve ambiguity, and when it is clear, its plain mean-
ing is followed). 
 32.  See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306 (1983) (relying on the plain meaning of both “veg-
etable” and “fruit” to reason that a tomato was taxable under the Tariff Act); see also United 
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985) (relying on the plain meaning of the phrase “prior to De-
cember 31st” to hold that the language was unambiguous and required filing before December 
31st). 
 33.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
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positive.34  Part II.A.1 outlines the Court’s use of plain meaning.  Parts 
II.A.2 and II.A.3 discuss other tools the Court may use to construe a statute, 
either in conjunction with, or after a plain meaning analysis.  Specifically, 
Part II.A.2 describes the Court’s use of three canons of construction, and 
Part II.A.3 describes how the Court might examine statutory context. 
1.  The Court Examines the Plain Meaning of Statutory Language 
to Assess Whether a Statute Is Ambiguous 
Absent a statutory definition, the Court will use various mechanisms to 
try to interpret the meaning of a statute.35  One of the most prominent tools 
of statutory interpretation is an analysis of a provision’s plain meaning, 
which courts apply either exclusively, or in conjunction with other mecha-
nisms of statutory construction.36  To discern plain meaning, the Court has 
historically considered, among other things, a term’s dictionary definition, 
meaning in “common parlance,” and traditional construction in the legal 
realm.37  In Nix v. Hedden,38 the Court adamantly adhered to the plain 
meaning of “tomato” as used in the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883 to resolve 
ambiguity.39  In Nix, the plaintiff sought to recover duties he paid under the 
Act for importing tomatoes.40  He argued that tomatoes were not regulated 
by the Act because it specifically imposed taxes on the importation of vege-
tables, and tomatoes are a fruit.41  The Court held that a tomato is not a fruit 
because of the dictionary definitions of “fruit” and “vegetable,” and testi-
                                                          
 34.  See infra note 79. 
 35.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (noting that “[w]hen a word is 
not defined by a statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning” 
(citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 
585 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that a term in a statute will only be given its ordinary 
meaning “‘[i]n the absence of [a statutory] definition’” (alteration in original) (quoting FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994))). 
 36.  See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1978) (noting that the one 
“cardinal canon before all others” is that “the legislature says in a statute what it means” (first cit-
ing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989); then citing United States v. 
Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1897); and then citing Oneale v. Thorton, 6 Cranch 53, 68 
(1810))). 
 37.  See Nix, 149 U.S. at 306–07 (interpreting the meaning of “vegetable” within the Tariff 
Act of March 3, 1883 by analyzing the term’s dictionary definitions, trade usage, and common 
language); see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107 (2007) (reasoning, in part, 
that the word “attempt,” as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), refers to a person’s intent and action, by 
noting that in “common parlance” and in the “law for centuries” the word “attempt” encompasses 
both overt act and intent elements); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
225 (1994) (relying on several dictionary definitions of the word “modify” to reject petitioner’s 
interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2)).  
 38.  149 U.S. 304 (1983). 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 305–06. 
 41.  Id.  
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mony that the terms did not have “any special meaning in trade and com-
merce” demonstrated that a tomato was clearly defined as a vegetable.42 
Likewise, the Court in Caminetti v. United States43 affirmed the con-
victions of the three petitioners for violating the White Slave Traffic Act by 
exclusively examining the statute’s plain meaning.44  It reasoned that a stat-
ute’s meaning must first “be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 
according to its terms.”45  The Court concluded that there was no ambiguity 
in the Act’s language, and therefore additional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion were unnecessary.46  However, in a recent 2012 case, Roberts v. Sea-
Land Services,47 the Court readily considered other tools of statutory inter-
pretation to analyze the phrase “newly awarded compensation” within 33 
U.S.C. § 906(c) because it initially found the plain meaning to be “indeter-
minate.”48 
Comparatively, the Court in Holy Trinity Church v. United States49 did 
not follow the plain meaning approach while interpreting the text of 23 Stat. 
332 c. 164, which prohibited facilitating a foreigner’s entry into the United 
States under contract to perform “labor or service of any kind.”50  The Holy 
Trinity Church Corporation had hired an Englishman to work as a minister 
in New York, and even though the Court reasoned that the corporation’s ac-
tion clearly violated the statute’s language, it found in the corporation’s fa-
vor.51  Instead of adopting a plain meaning approach to statutory interpreta-
tion and adhering to the provision’s text, the Court adopted an intentionalist 
approach and disregarded plain meaning.52  It reasoned, first, that it was not 
                                                          
 42.  Id.  The dictionary definitions of “fruit” and “vegetable” were taken from Webster’s Dic-
tionary, Worcester’s Dictionary, and the Imperial Dictionary, and presented as evidence at trial 
along with testimony regarding the terms’ common trade usage.  Id. 
 43.  242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
 44.  Id. at 485.  
 45.  Id. (first citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889); then citing Bate Re-
frigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33 (1895); then citing United States v. Lexington Mill & 
Elevator Co. 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914); and then citing United States v. First Nat’l Bank, 234 U.S. 
245, 258 (1914)). 
 46.  Id.; see also Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59–60 (1930) (noting that the plain mean-
ing of a statute can only be overridden by “rare and exceptional circumstances”). 
 47.  132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012). 
 48.  Id. at 1356–57.  In addition to examining plain meaning, the Court considered the com-
prehensive scheme of 33 U.S.C. § 901, within which § 906(c) is found.  Id. at 1357–58.  Thirty-
three U.S.C. § 906(c) “caps benefits for most types of disability at twice the national average 
weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an injured employee is ‘newly awarded compensation.’”  
Id. at 1354 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 906(c) (2006)). 
 49.  143 U.S. 457 (1892).  
 50.  Id. at 458 (quoting Ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332) (repealed 1952). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 464–71; see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985) (implementing 
an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation, while determining the scope of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 848, by reasoning that the Court’s analysis would end once it determined what Congress intend-
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“within [the] spirit nor within the intention of [the statute’s] makers” to pe-
nalize hiring a minister.53  Second, it reasoned that the Act’s title demon-
strated that the statute was meant to prohibit “manual labor,” not the work 
of a professional rector.54  Finally, the Court noted that the Act was created 
to prevent an influx of untrained foreign laborers because they impeded the 
domestic labor market, and that therefore the importation of one adept min-
ister did not fall in this category.55  Some courts have taken issue with the 
Holy Trinity Court’s approach because it disregarded the clear language of 
the provision’s text and declined to adhere to the plain meaning approach.56  
Others consider the case to be an illustration of the Court’s ability to stray 
from the plain meaning approach in order to avoid reading a term in a man-
ner that would “compel an odd result.”57  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
generally adheres to provisions’ language when plain meaning is discerna-
ble to ensure that it does not improperly alter a statute’s function or scope to 
comport with its own views.58  Plain meaning remains a “cardinal canon,” 
and a majority of people believe that “courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means.”59 
                                                          
ed the provision to mean); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201–02 (1979) 
(demonstrating an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation, while determining the scope 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by ascertaining “Congress’ primary concern in enacting” the 
Act—prohibiting racial discrimination—and concluding that the Court must reject any construc-
tion of the Act at odds with this purpose).  
 53.  Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.  The Court also specifically noted that subjecting a 
church to a penalty for hiring a pastor who was an immigrant would be an “absurd consequence” 
that Congress did not intend.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 462–63 (emphasis added).  
 55.  Id. at 463–64.  
 56.  See Jaskoloski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Court’s ap-
proach in Holy Trinity Church has “no modern traction”); see also Soppet v. Enhance Recovery 
Co., 679 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2012) (opposing the intentionalist approach because it allows the 
judiciary to make “substantive changes” to a law, which would give it too much “law-making 
power”). 
 57.  See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1989) (reasoning that 
congressional intent must be used to ascertain a word’s meaning “[w]here the literal reading of a 
statutory term would ‘compel an odd result’” (first quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 
490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989); then citing Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 454)).  But see Watt v. 
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (“The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation 
may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal 
effect.” (first citing Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459; then citing United States v. Ryan, 284 
U.S. 167, 175 (1931))). 
 58.  See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (noting that courts do not have a 
“carte blanche to redraft statutes” and “the Judiciary [is not] licensed to attempt to soften the clear 
import of Congress’ chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh result” 
(citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981)).  
 59.  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1978); see also Muscarello v. Unit-
ed States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1998) (beginning the process of statutory interpretation with an 
analysis of the dictionary definition and general usage of the word “carry”); Locke, 471 U.S. at 93 
(relying on the plain meaning of the phrase “prior to December 31” to hold that the language was 
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2.  The Court Has Historically Used Canons of Construction to 
Help Interpret Statutes When They Are Ambiguous 
In addition to an assessment of plain meaning, the Court may apply 
several canons of construction to help resolve statutory ambiguity.  In some 
instances, the Court uses these canons to discern what the legislature in-
tended with regard to a statute’s meaning or function.60  In others, the Court 
uses these canons as “purely textual devices” to guide its analysis of a stat-
ute’s language directly.61  In any event, they “function as helpful guides in 
construing ambiguous statutory provisions.”62  The canons do not, however, 
“conclusive[ly]” resolve ambiguity as they are susceptible to many different 
interpretations, often being “‘countered . . . by some maxim pointing in a 
different direction.’”63  The Court in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons64 dis-
cussed the canons of construction noscitur a sociis,65 that is, “a word is 
known by the company it keeps,” and ejusdem generis, which is the princi-
ple that when general words follow specific words in a statute, the general 
words should be interpreted to reference objects similar to those denoted by 
the previous, specific words.66  The Court concluded that these canons did 
not apply to the statute, but the dissent still acknowledged their general util-
ity.67  Comparatively, the Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.68 relied on 
noscitur a sociis to reason that Congress intended the term “prospectus” to 
reference public communication because it was found within a list of nouns 
that included “documents of wide dissemination.”69 
Another notable canon of construction is the canon against surplusage, 
which stipulates that a statute should not be read in a manner that renders 
                                                          
unambiguous and required mining claimants to file claims with the Bureau of Land Management 
before December 31 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (1976)). 
 60.  Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228–29 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 61.  Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 62.  Id. at 229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 63.  Id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 
825–26 (2013) (noting that the canons of construction are just “‘[a] rul[e] of thumb’ that can tip 
the scales when a statute could be read in multiple ways” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 
503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992))). 
 64.  552 U.S. 214 (2008). 
 65.  Id. at 225 (quoting S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 
(2006)). 
 66.  Id. at 223; Wash. State Dep’t of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Kef-
feler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003) (citing e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114–15).  
 67.  Ali, 552 U.S. at 229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The Court specifically listed two cases in 
which the canons were useful: Washington State Department of Social and Health Services. v. 
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 375 (2003) and Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 
481, 486–87 (2006).  Ali, 552 U.S. at 224 (plurality opinion). 
 68.  513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 69.  Id. at 575. 
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other parts of the statute superfluous.70  However, the canon’s value is 
strongest when it is used to illustrate the merits of an interpretation of a 
statute that would “give[] effect to every clause and word” if another inter-
pretation would render part of the statute unnecessary.71  For example, in 
Marx v. General Revenue Corp.,72 the petitioner argued that a district 
court’s ability to award costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) displaced other 
courts’ ability to award costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).73  Specifically, 
the petitioner contended that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) rendered the phrase 
“and costs” within Section 1692k(a)(3) superfluous.74  The Court rejected 
this argument and determined that the canon against surplusage was not ap-
plicable, in part, because there were no possible interpretations of Sec-
tion 1692k(a)(3) that would have successfully given effect to every part of 
the provision.75  In contrast, the Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. rejected 
the petitioner’s argument, in part, by applying the canon against surplus-
age.76  It reasoned that the petitioner’s broad interpretation of “communica-
tion,” as meaning “every written communication,” was inappropriate be-
cause it would render “notice, circular, advertisement [and] letter” redun-
redundant given that each are types of “written communication.”77 
3.  By Analyzing Statutory Context, the Court May Discern What 
Congress Intended With Regard to the Function or Meaning of 
a Provision, and Thereby Resolve Ambiguity 
In addition to the canons of construction, analysis of a provision’s con-
text has progressively been recognized as a central tenet of statutory inter-
pretation.  In some instances, the Court analyzes a statute’s context after its 
plain meaning analysis fails to resolve ambiguity.78  In other circumstances, 
                                                          
 70.  See Ali, 552 U.S. at 226 (noting that the “rule against superfluities” is applicable only if a 
statute’s construction truly renders other words in a statute unnecessary); see also Marx v. Gen. 
Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1178 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when 
an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.” (citing 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011)); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 
513 U.S. 561, 574–75 (1995) (finding that “communication,” as defined in § 2(10) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, could not be read to refer to all written communications because that would ren-
der “notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter, redundant,” given that each was likewise a form 
of written communication (alteration in original) (quoting the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10))).  
 71.  Marx, 133 S. Ct. at 1177 (2013) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 
2238, 2248 (2011)). 
 72.  133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013). 
 73.  Id. at 1173–74.  
 74.  Id. at 1177–78.  
 75.  Id. at 1177. 
 76.  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574–75 (1995). 
 77.  Id. (quoting the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10)). 
 78.  See supra note 36; Roberts v. Sea-Land Serv’s, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1356–57 (2012) 
(first quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997); then quoting Ingalls Shipbuild-
ing, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 255 (1997)). 
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the Court examines context in conjunction with plain meaning because a 
term’s definition may change depending on circumstance.79  There are two 
distinct kinds of context that a court may analyze: (1) historical context, that 
is, a provision’s legislative history, and (2) textual context, that is, a statute 
or larger Act’s terms.  Textual context may be discerned by, inter alia, ex-
amining a statute’s title, analyzing the larger statute within which a provi-
sion is located, and comparing similarly situated provisions.80  For instance, 
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States81 the Court analyzed the title of 8 
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) to determine whether it defined a separate offense, or 
merely increased the penalty for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which for-
bids immigrants who have been deported from returning to the United 
States without special permission.82  It reasoned that because the phrase 
“criminal penalties” appeared in the title of the 1988 amendment that creat-
ed Section 1326(b), and in several bills that preceded Section 1326(b)’s en-
actment, the provision was meant to prescribe criminal punishment stand-
ards and not to create a separate offense.83  Nevertheless, while analysis of a 
statute’s title is useful, it should only be used as a supplement, in conjunc-
tion with other mechanisms of interpretation.84 
Additionally, the Supreme Court may interpret a statute’s terms by 
comparing how they are construed and utilized in similar statutory provi-
                                                          
 79.  See e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“[P]lainness or ambiguity 
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in 
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole” (first citing Estate 
of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); then citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 
500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991))); see also Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 234 (2008) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that statutory context must be examined in conjunction with 
plain meaning because a term’s plain meaning may change depending on context). 
 80.  See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 574–75 (determining the meaning of the word “prospectus,” 
as used in § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, by analyzing and comparing § 2(10) of the Secu-
rities Act); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172–73 (2001) (interpreting the scope of the 
phrase “application for State Post-conviction or other collateral review,” as used in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(2), by comparing the use of the terms “State” and “Federal” within 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2254(i), 2261(e), and 2264(a)(3) (emphasis added)); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 462–63 (1892) (analyzing the provision’s title, “[a]n act to prohibit the importation and 
migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United 
States . . . ,” in order to construe 23 Stat. 332 c. 164). 
 81.  523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 82.  Id. at 226; Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 462; United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 
321 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 83.  Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234. 
 84.  See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (explaining 
that “a subchapter heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute” (citing e.g., Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)); see also Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 
1158, 1169 (2014) (explaining that a title is merely a “‘short-hand reference’” to the provision’s 
“‘general subject matter,’” which makes it an ineffective tool of statutory interpretation (quoting 
Bhd. Of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947)); United States v. Law-
rence, 727 F.3d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that analysis of a statute’s title “is only relevant 
where the language is ambiguous”).  
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sions.85  For example, the Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.86 compared 
similar provisions to interpret Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.87  Specifically, the Court analyzed the meaning of “employee,” as used 
in Section 704(a), in part, by comparing how the term “employee” was used 
in Sections 706(g)(1), 717(b), and 717(c) in Title VII.88  The Court posited 
that the statutory context of these other provisions indicated that “employ-
ee” denoted current and former employees, which supported a parallel, ex-
pansive construction of “employee” in Section 704(a).89 
Likewise, the Court in Muscarello v. United States90 interpreted the 
term “carry,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which makes it a crime to 
“‘use[] or carr[y] a firearm’ ‘during and in relation to’ a ‘drug trafficking 
crime’”91 by comparing it to surrounding provisions.92  In Muscarello, the 
petitioner contended that a broad construction of the term “carry,” applying 
to persons who actually and constructively carry a firearm, was inappropri-
ate.93  Specifically, he argued that a broad construction would erroneously 
make “carry” indistinguishable from the word “transport,” which was meant 
to likewise broadly reference the “movement of goods in bulk over great 
distances.”94  The Court rejected petitioner’s argument by comparing Sec-
tion 924(c)(1) to 18 U.S.C. §§ 926(a) and 924(b).95  It reasoned that the def-
initions of “transport” and “carry” remained discrete, even if “carry” was 
construed broadly, because Congress used “transport” in Sections 924(a) 
and 926(b) to “signify a different, and broader, statutory coverage” than 
“carry.”96  Therefore, Congress likewise intended “transport” to denote a 
separate, broader scope than “carry,” and encompass persons who actually 
and constructively carry a firearm.97 
                                                          
 85.  See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082–83 (2015) (plurality opinion) (compar-
ing § 1519 to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also id. at 1087 (compar-
ing § 1519 to an evidence tampering provision in the Model Penal Code); Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1998) (comparing the use of the term “transport” in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1) to its use in other similar statutory provisions); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172–
73 (2001) (interpreting the scope of the phrase “application for State Post-conviction or other col-
lateral review,” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), by comparing the use of the terms “State” and 
“Federal” within 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(i), 2261(e), and 2264(a)(3) (emphasis added)). 
 86.  519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 342–44. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 91.  Id. at 126 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)). 
 92.  Id. at 126–27. 
 93.  Id. at 134. 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. at 134–35. 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id.  
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B.  Perspectives Diverge as to Whether Legislative History Should Be 
Examined Initially with Other Tools of Statutory Interpretation, or 
as a Last Resort After a Statute Has Been Deemed Ambiguous 
When engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court may analyze a 
statute’s historical context, that is, its legislative history.98  In doing so, the 
Court examines, inter alia, congressional records, congressional reports, and 
the circumstances prompting a provision’s enactment.  Legislative history is 
analyzed to discern what Congress intended a statute’s purpose and scope to 
be in an effort to ensure that the Court construes a provision in a manner 
that maintains its anticipated function.99  In certain instances, the Court ana-
lyzes legislative history from the outset, in conjunction with statutory con-
text and plain meaning, to determine whether a statute is ambiguous.100  In 
others, it assesses legislative history only after it has found that a statute is 
ambiguous.101  However, some believe that the use of legislative history 
should be abandoned altogether, or at least substantially limited.102  This is 
due to the fact that legislative history can often be construed to either sup-
port or oppose a statute’s construction depending on a party’s preference, 
which might lead to partisan interpretations and misleading arguments.103  
In Lamie v. United States Trustee,104 the Court analyzed the legislative his-
tory of 11 U.S.C. § 330 (a)(1), which “regulates court awards of profession-
                                                          
 98.  See supra Part II.A.3 discussing two kinds of context, historical context and textual con-
text. 
 99.  See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940) (“When aid to 
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 
‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examina-
tion.’” (footnote omitted)).  
 100.  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577 (1995); Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125, 132 (1998). 
 101.  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 251–54 (1992); Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 
526, 534 (2004). 
 102.  See MORI Assocs. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 503, 537–40 (2011) (describing the re-
cent trend in the Supreme Court of returning to the traditional approach to statutory interpretation 
where the Court adheres to interpreting the statute’s text and does not examine legislative history); 
see also supra note 36; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) (reasoning that the intention-
alist approach used in Holy Trinity Church can only apply in “rare and exceptional circumstanc-
es”). 
 103.  See e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).  In Yates, the plurality interpret-
ed the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 to mean that the term “tangible object,” as used in § 
1519, should be construed to reference only objects that could be used to record or preserve in-
formation.  Id. at 1079.  Comparatively, the dissent interpreted the legislative history to mean that 
“tangible object” should be construed to mean any physical object.  Id. at 1093; see also Tenn. 
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).  In Hill, the plurality interpreted the legislative history 
of 16 U.S.C. § 1536 to mean that the provision was meant to “halt and reverse the trend toward 
species extinction, whatever the cost.”  Id. at 184 (emphasis added).  In contrast, the dissent inter-
preted the legislative history as providing an exception to this provision for projects that are com-
pleted or substantially completed even if they may threaten an endangered species.  Id. at 195–96; 
see infra notes 104–107. 
 104.  540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
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al fees,” only after assessing statutory context and plain meaning.105  The 
Court reasoned that the legislative history contained “uncertainties,” which 
led to “competing interpretations” of the statute.106  Therefore, it was more 
prudent to rely on the preceding statutory context and plain meaning anal-
yses.107  Similarly, the Court in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain108 
rejected the respondent’s argument that the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292, a statute establishing the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction, implied 
that it should be narrowly construed.109  Instead, the Court held that inquiry 
into legislative history was unnecessary because the statute’s language was 
equivocal.110 
 In contrast, the Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. simultaneously ad-
dressed legislative history and statutory context to discern the meaning of 
“prospectus,” as used in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.111  In 
distinguishing United States v. Naftalin,112 it reasoned that an analysis of 
legislative history was “[o]f equal importance” to an analysis of statutory 
context, even though the history was inconclusive as to congressional intent 
in this instance.113  Likewise, in Muscarello v. United States, the Court rea-
soned that Congress intended “carry” to be construed broadly by initially 
analyzing Section 924 (c)(1)’s legislative history in conjunction with plain 
meaning.114 
Nevertheless, there are instances where the Court takes a third, com-
prehensive approach to statutory interpretation, first ascertaining a term’s 
plain meaning, but also supplementing it with instructive legislative history.  
The Court in Bifulco v. United States115 adopted this approach to interpret 
the meaning of “imprisonment” within 21 U.S.C. § 406, a provision of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1960.116  Spe-
cifically, the Bifulco Court addressed whether the provision authorized a 
“special parole term” in addition to a term of confinement.117  In doing so, 
the Court initially assessed the provision’s plain meaning by noting that 
other courts had held that “special parole term” was included in the term of 
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 529. 
 106.  Id. at 541–42. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  503 U.S. 249 (1992). 
 109.  Id. at 251–53. 
 110.  Id. at 254. 
 111.  513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 112.  441 U.S. 768, 774–78 (1979). 
 113.  Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577. 
 114.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 132 (1998). 
 115.  447 U.S. 381 (1980). 
 116.  Id. at 382–83. 
 117.  Id. at 388–98. 
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“imprisonment,” not supplementary.118  It determined, however, that the 
views of these courts were not persuasive because not all substantive of-
fenses to which Section 406 applies can legally designate a “special term of 
parole.”119  Subsequently, the Court evaluated Section 406’s legislative his-
tory, which revealed that Congress enacted the provision with no intention 
of systematically including a special parole term.120  Therefore, the Court 
reasoned that the term “imprisonment” could not automatically implement 
one.121 
C.  Viewpoints Vary as to What 18 U.S.C. § 1519’s Legislative History 
Reflects With Regard to Congressional Intent 
Given the contrasting views, the Yates Court readily assessed the legis-
lative history of Section 1519 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act122 to resolve Sec-
tion 1519’s ambiguity.123  Citing to the Senate Report on the Act, the Court 
noted that Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to Enron’s 
massive accounting fraud scandal to “restore confidence” in financial mar-
kets and “enhance accountability” for financial fraud.124 It also posited that 
Section 1519 was created as a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to spe-
cifically prevent persons from shredding documents related to corporate 
fraud in an attempt to destroy evidence and conceal misconduct.125  How-
ever, the Justices differed as to what the legislative history means, that is, 
whether Section 1519 is meant to only apply to corporate fraud, or if it is 
meant to cover the “whole world of evidence-tampering.”126   
Part II.C.1 provides background on Enron’s collapse, which prompted 
Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Section 1519.  Part II.C.2 
discusses the provisions’ legislative history.  Part II.C.3 describes lower 
courts’ varied applications of Section 1519 resulting from conflicting inter-
pretations of the legislative histories. 
                                                          
 118.  Id. at 388. 
 119.  Id.   
 120.  Id. at 398. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). 
 123.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 124.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079 (2015) (plurality opinion); S. REP. NO. 
107–146, at 2, 11 (2002).  
 125.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079–81 (plurality opinion); compare 148 CONG. REC. 12,512 (2002) 
(statement of Sen. Lott), with S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 14 (2002) (noting that § 1519 was created 
as a “general anti shredding provision” to “close loopholes in the existing criminal laws relating to 
the destruction . . . of evidence”).  But see Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1093 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that § 1519 was created to supplement § 1512(b)(2)).  
 126.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1092 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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1.  Historical Background on Enron’s Financial Fraud 
During the 1990s, Enron experienced a period of rapid growth and be-
came one of the world’s leading energy companies, trading its stock at 
about $90.00 a share by 2000.127  On October 16, 2001, however, Enron 
announced a “$618 million net loss for the third quarter”128 and a “$1.01 
billion charge to earnings.”129  A few days later, the company released an-
other statement announcing that between 1997 and 2001 it had overstated 
its earnings by $586 million, which caused Enron’s stock value to abruptly 
drop below $1.00.130  The company filed for bankruptcy in December of 
2001, prompting the United States Department of Justice to form an “Enron 
Task Force” in order to investigate the company’s collapse.131  The inquiry 
revealed two things: (1) several of Enron’s executives and its accountant, 
Arthur Andersen LLP, facilitated and benefited from a massive accounting 
fraud maneuver where the company used “thousands of off-the-books enti-
ties to overstate corporate profits, understate corporate debts and inflate En-
ron’s stock price,”132 and (2) even after being subpoenaed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Arthur Andersen LLP had ordered several em-
ployees on its Enron team to institute a “wholesale destruction” of any doc-
uments relating to the fraud.133  Andersen was found guilty of obstructing 
justice in June 2002.134  Enron’s collapse had a widespread effect; its inves-
tors lost billions of dollars, its employees were left with worthless retire-
ment funds, and companies that Enron had regularly invested in suffered 
systematic losses.135  The fraud revealed severe deficiencies in the legal sys-
tem with regard to regulating and punishing corporate fraud, and Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to provide prosecutors with a mechanism 
by which they could prevent future financial fraud and “restore trust in the 
financial markets.”136 
                                                          
 127.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005); S. REP. NO. 107–146, 
at 2–3. 
 128.  S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 3. 
 129.  Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 700. 
 130.  S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 3. 
 131.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 367–68 (2010); see also S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 
3. 
 132.  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2–4. 
 133.  Id. at 4; see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 367–68.  
 134.  United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (2004), rev’d, Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 135.  S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 3–4. 
 136.  Id. at 2; Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079; see also Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1162 
(2014) (noting that the Enron scandal demonstrated a need for provisions that would safeguard 
financial fraud “whistleblowers,” which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act implemented). 
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2.  Courts Have Gleaned Two Different Interpretations of Section 
1519 by Examining Legislative History 
Some courts have held that the legislative history of Section 1519 and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act illustrates that Congress intended Section 1519 to 
apply narrowly, only in cases of financial fraud.137  Other courts have inter-
preted the history to mean that Section 1519 should be applied broadly, to 
the “whole world of evidence-tampering.”138  The 2002 Senate Report on 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act declares that the Act’s purpose, in pertinent part, 
“is to provide for criminal prosecution . . . of persons who defraud investors 
in publicly traded securities or alter or destroy evidence in certain Federal 
investigations . . . and for other purposes.”139  Furthermore, legislators have 
identified “three major components” of the Act: (1) it provides prosecutors 
with a means to punish and indict “those who defraud investors;” (2) it in-
creases investigators’ ability to “collect and preserve evidence which proves 
fraud;” and (3) it “protects victim’s rights to recover from those who have 
cheated them.”140 
Sources support both the narrow interpretation of Section 1519 and the 
broad interpretation of Section 1519.141  For instance, some senator’s state-
ments from congressional reports seem to support a narrow scope: Senator 
Trent Lott identifies the purpose of Section 1519 as “increas[ing] penalties 
for corporate fraud” and related document shredding;142 Senator Orrin 
Hatch describes the individual whom the provision is meant to punish as: 
“A person who steals, defrauds, or otherwise deprives unsuspecting Ameri-
cans of their life savings . . .; the crook who cooks the books . . .; the charla-
tan who sells phony bonds . . .; and the . . . man who runs a Ponzi 
scheme . . . ,” and he continues, stating “[i]t is time . . . to get tough with 
these offenders.”143  Furthermore, Senator Barbara Boxer specifically men-
tions that the provisions’ ultimate goals are to protect corporate fraud vic-
tims, “preserve evidence of corporate crimes and hold corporate wrongdo-
ers accountable.”144 
Language from the 2002 Senate Report could, however, be construed 
to support a broad interpretation of Section 1519.  The report describes a 
need for wider reaching “obstruction of justice statutes relating to document 
destruction” because current provisions are interpreted too narrowly and 
                                                          
 137.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 138.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1092 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
 139.  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2. 
 140.  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11. 
 141.  See S. REP. NO. 107-146; 148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (2002); 148 CONG. REC. 12,512 
(2002). 
 142.  148 CONG. REC. 12,512 (statement by Sen. Lott). 
 143.  148 CONG. REC. 12,513 (statement by Sen. Hatch). 
 144.  148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (statement by Sen. Boxer). 
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create “loopholes in the existing criminal laws.”145  The report even specifi-
cally relays that “Section 1519 is meant to apply broadly to any acts to de-
stroy or fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with the intent 
to obstruct, impede or influence the investigation.”146  Contradictory lan-
guage in the Senate Report and congressional record demonstrates the diffi-
culties associated with the Court’s use of legislative history to construe 
statutes, showing that these kinds of texts are often interpreted in various 
ways.147 
3.  Courts Have Applied 18 U.S.C. § 1519 Inconsistently 
Since its enactment, Section 1519 has raised, in pertinent part, two 
main issues in district and appellate courts.  First, is the definition of “tan-
gible object” broad, including any physical object, or is it narrow, including 
only objects that can record or preserve information?148  Second, is Section 
1519 applicable in cases that do not involve financial fraud?149  Addressing 
both of these questions, the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut in United States v. Russell150 rejected the defendant’s conten-
tion that “tangible object” referred only to “storage media that contain rec-
ords and documents.”151  It reasoned that “tangible object’s” ordinary mean-
ing, any physical object, controlled because that statutory language was 
unambiguous and because a narrow interpretation of “tangible object” 
would render the term useless.152  The Russell court also determined that 
Section 1519 applied outside of financial fraud cases because its legislative 
history indicated that Congress intended for the provision to be used in var-
ious circumstances.153 
In United States v. Diana Shipping Services154 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld a co-defendant’s con-
viction under Section 1519 for inaccurately documenting the disposal of 
several pipes, which crewmembers threw overboard a commercial shipping 
                                                          
 145.  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See supra note 103. 
 148.  United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); 
United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 149.  Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 238; United States v. Wortman, 488 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Smyth, 213 F. App’x 102, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Jackson, 186 
F. App’x 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 150.  639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 151.  Id. at 238. 
 152.  Id.; see also Yates, 733 F.3d at 1059 (holding that the language of § 1519 was unambigu-
ous and so the ordinary meaning of “tangible object” controlled); United States v. Wortman, 488 
F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2007) (interpreting § 1519 broadly and finding the defendant guilty of vio-
lating the provision for destroying a CD containing child pornography). 
 153.  Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38.  
 154.  985 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E. D. Va. 2013).  
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vessel, in the boat’s log.155  Confronting the question of Section 1519’s 
scope, the court determined that, while this case did not involve financial 
fraud, Section 1519 still applied.156  It reasoned that Section 1519’s “broad 
statutory language set[ting] forth numerous clauses criminalizing various 
conduct,” and its legislative history, illustrated the provision’s “intentional-
ly broad reach.”157  Similarly, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland in United States v. Stevens158 and the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Hunt159 applied Section 1519 in instances that did not relate 
to financial fraud—finding defendants guilty under Section 1519 for com-
posing documents with falsified information.160 
D.  If the Court Cannot Resolve a Criminal Statute’s Ambiguity 
Through Tools of Statutory Construction It May Invoke the Rule of 
Lenity 
After the Yates Court concluded its statutory interpretation analysis it 
discussed the rule of lenity and its applicability to Section 1519.161  The rule 
of lenity counsels that, if a court cannot reasonably interpret a criminal stat-
ute, it should resolve any uncertainty in favor of the defendant.162  The “pol-
icy of lenity” emphasizes that courts should discern legislative intent 
through sound principles of statutory interpretation to avoid construing stat-
utes as imposing criminal penalties “based on no more than a guess as to 
what Congress intended.”163  The rule is founded on two traditional policies 
                                                          
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 727, 729. 
 158.  771 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D. Md. 2011). 
 159.  526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 160.  Compare Hunt, 526 F.3d at 744 (reasoning that the defendant’s false entry in a police 
report violated 18 U.S.C. § 1519), and Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (holding that defendant 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1519 by falsifying and concealing documents related to her company’s al-
leged “off-label promotion of Wellbutrin”), with United States v. Mermelstein, 487 F. Supp. 2d 
242, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (mem.) (involving a defendant charged with falsifying documents in 
order to fraudulently obtain payment for medical procedures), and United States v. Lessner, 498 
F.3d 185, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding defendant guilty under § 1519 for destroying evidence relat-
ed to her falsification of contracts of sale that misrepresented prices of military merchandise to 
overcharge the federal government). 
 161.  135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088–89 (2015). 
 162.  See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 284–85 (1978) (explaining that 
the rule of lenity states that if a criminal statute is deemed ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved in 
favor of the defendant (first quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); then citing 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971))); see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125, 138–39 (1997) (noting that the rule of lenity only applies in the face of “grievous ambi-
guity” (footnote omitted) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994))).  
 163.  Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 382, 387 (1980) (first quoting Lander v. United States, 
358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958); then citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 n.10 (1980); 
and then citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14–15 (1978))); Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)). 
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derived from the idea of due process.  First, to be constitutional, a statute 
must clearly and understandably provide citizens with fair warning that cer-
tain criminal conduct is prohibited.164  Second, due to the “seriousness of 
criminal penalties,” legislatures must delineate punishment, and the Court 
should implement those penalties as prescribed by Congress.165  The rule of 
lenity is not used to interpret statutes.  It is only implemented when “tradi-
tional tools of statutory interpretation” fail to remedy ambiguity.166  In some 
instances, the Court has noted that the rule of lenity should only be applied 
in the face of grave ambiguity, after all reasonable mechanisms of statutory 
construction have been “exhausted.”167  In others, the Court has applied the 
rule of lenity more willingly, when “any doubt” is left as to a statute’s 
meaning.168  For instance, the Court in United States v. Granderson169 ap-
plied the rule of lenity to 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), which provides that “if a per-
son serving . . . probation possesses illegal drugs, ‘the court shall revoke 
the . . . probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one-third of 
the original sentence.’”170  After failing his drug test, the defendant’s five-
year probation was revoked under Section 3565(a), and he was resentenced 
to twenty months in prison because the trial court defined the defendant’s 
“original sentence” as his sixty-month probation.171  However, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the rule of lenity with regard to 
Section 3565(a), and vacated the defendant’s sentence, resentencing him to 
a term of zero to six months imprisonment.172  The Supreme Court affirmed 
the court of appeals’ ruling.173  The Court reasoned that Congress left Sec-
tion 3565(a) “susceptible to at least three interpretations” with regard to the 
                                                          
 164.  See, e.g., Bass, 404 U.S. at 347–48 (reasoning that in order to provide fair warning, a 
statute must clearly describe, in understandable language, “what the law intends to do if a certain 
line is passed” (first quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (foot-
note omitted); then citing United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1952))); see also Bouie 
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1964) (noting that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment requires a statute to provide fair warning (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612, 617–618 (1954)). 
 165.  Bass, 404 U.S. at 348, 347–48; infra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088.  
 167.  Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2281 (2014) (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also 
Moskal v. United States 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have declined to deem a statute ‘ambig-
uous’ for purposes of lenity merely because it was possible to articulate a construction more nar-
row than that urged by the Government.” (citing e.g., McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 
657–58 (1982))); see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1997) (noting that 
the rule of lenity only applies in the face of “grievous ambiguity” (footnote omitted) (quoting Sta-
ples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994))). 
 168.  See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088 (emphasis added). 
 169.  511 U.S. 39 (1994).  
 170.  Id. at 41 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (1988)) (emphasis added). 
 171.  Id. at 43. 
 172.  Id. at 43–44. 
 173.  Id. at 56.  
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meaning of the term “original sentence.”174  Therefore, it was appropriate to 
resolve the case in favor of the defendant, and implement a lesser sen-
tence.175 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit, holding that that the term “tangible object” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 on-
ly refers to objects that can be used to “record or preserve” information.176  
Justice Ginsburg announced the judgment of the Court, in which Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined, and Justice Alito 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.177  The Court reasoned that it 
was Congress’s intent that “tangible object” be narrowly construed by as-
sessing several different mechanisms of statutory construction: the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act’s purpose, the ordinary meaning of “tangible object,” 
“tangible object’s” meaning in other similar provisions, the title of Section 
1519, Section 1519’s position within Title 18 Chapter 73, the canon against 
surplusage, and the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.178 
The Yates Court began its analysis by examining the purpose of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  It noted that the Act was created in response to En-
ron’s large-scale accounting fraud, and that its function was to “restore trust 
in financial markets” and prevent further financial fraud.179  Furthermore, 
the Court explained that Section 1519 was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to supplement 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b),180 another provision of the 
Act that barred persons from “persuad[ing] another person to shred docu-
ments,” in order to specifically prohibit persons from directly destroying 
documents.181  Consequently, the Yates Court concluded that Congress in-
tended “tangible object,” as used in Section 1519, to refer only to objects 
that can record or preserve information, as opposed to any physical ob-
jects.182 
Next, the Court considered the ordinary meaning of “tangible object,” 
but noted that a term’s ordinary meaning is not dispositive in isolation be-
cause a term can mean different things in different contexts.183  The Court 
                                                          
 174.  Id. at 41. 
 175.  Id. at 56.  
 176.  135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
 177.  Id. at 1078. 
 178.  Id. at 1081–89.  
 179.  Id. at 1079–81; see also supra Part II.D.1.   
 180.  18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2012).  
 181.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081. 
 182.  Id. at 1079–81. 
 183.  Id. at 1081 (defining “tangible object” as “a discrete . . . thing” that “possess[es] physical 
form” (alteration in original) (first quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1555 (2002); then quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1683 (10th ed. 2014))); see also Yates, 135 
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used this rationale to reject the government’s argument that “tangible ob-
ject’s” ordinary meaning was any physical object here because “tangible 
object” meant any physical object in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16.184  The Court determined that, while a broad interpretation of “tangible 
object” was appropriate within Rule 16—in light of the Rule’s broad 
scope—Section 1519’s much narrower scope required a much narrower in-
terpretation.185  The Court similarly rejected the government’s comparison 
of “tangible object’s” meaning in Section 1519 to its meaning in a 1962 
Model Penal Code evidence tampering statute.186  It reasoned that the Mod-
el Penal Code provision was incomparable to Section 1519 because it im-
parted different penalties and prohibited different conduct; therefore, its 
definition of “tangible object” as any physical evidence had no bearing on 
Section 1519’s definition of “tangible object.”187 
In addition, the Court analyzed the context of Section 1519 by examin-
ing its caption and title, its placement in Title 18 Chapter 73, and several 
instructive canons of construction.  First, the Yates Court examined Section 
1519’s caption, and the title of Section 802, that is, the Section of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act within which Section 1519 is found.188  The Court rea-
soned that the caption and title indicated that Congress intended “tangible 
object” to be construed narrowly because they referenced “specific sub-
set[s] of records and documents.”189  Next, the Court determined that Sec-
tion 1519’s position in Title 18 Chapter 73 suggested that “tangible object” 
must be construed narrowly because the preceding sections, Sections 1516, 
1517, and 1518, all prohibited specific obstructive behavior.190  Therefore, 
Section 1519 should likewise “prohibit[] obstructive acts in specific con-
texts.”191 
                                                          
S. Ct. at 1081–82 (noting that “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined 
[not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))).  
 184.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1082–83.  
 185.  Id.  Rule 16 requires that prosecutors give defense counsel evidence that is “material to 
the charges at issue.”  Id. at 1083. 
 186.  Id. at 1087. 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id. at 1083 (noting that the caption of §1519 is “[d]estruction, alteration, or falsification 
of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,” and the title of Section 802 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is “[c]riminal penalties for altering documents”). 
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id. at 1083–84 (emphasis added).  The Court also reasoned that Congress intended 
§ 1519 to be construed narrowly because it specifically chose to place other provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act next to sections that prohibited broad obstructive acts, which indicated that con-
gress had the option, but actively chose not to place § 1519 in proximity to the broad provisions.  
Id.  
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The Yates Court also applied three canons of construction in order to 
examine Section 1519’s context: the canon against surplusage, the canon 
noscitur a sociis, and the canon ejusdem generis.  The Court employed the 
canon against surplusage, which compels courts to interpret statutory lan-
guage in a manner that does not render other parts of a statute superfluous, 
while comparing Section 1519 to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1).192  Section 
1512(c)(1) prohibits “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a 
record, document, or other object.”193  The Court reasoned that the phrase 
“or other object” in Section 1512(c)(1) meant any physical object.194  
Therefore, if “tangible object” in Section 1519 also referred to any physical 
object, Section 1512(c)(1) would be rendered useless.195  The Court posited 
that any act violating Section 1519 would also violate Section 1512(c)(1) 
because both provisions would prohibit altering the same list of items.196  
Consequently, it concluded that “tangible object” must be construed nar-
rowly to reference only objects that could “record or preserve information” 
to avoid rendering Section 1512(c)(1) superfluous.197 
The Court also relied on the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem gen-
eris.198  Applying noscitur a sociis, the Court noted that “tangible object” 
was the last term in a list of nouns preceded by “record” and “document.”199  
Consequently, the Court concluded that “tangible object” was meant to re-
fer to a “subset of tangible objects involving records or documents, i.e., ob-
jects used to record or preserve information.”200  Also, given that the verbs 
“falsifies” and “makes a false entry in” precede the nouns, the Court deter-
mined the list must reference objects that can be “falsified” or used to 
“make a false entry in.”201  Applying ejusdem generis, the Court posited 
                                                          
 192.  Id. at 1084–85; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2012) (“Whoever corruptly alters, de-
stroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the 
intent to impair the objects integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding . . . .”). 
 193.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1)).  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id.  
 196.  Id. at 1084–85.  The Court also reasoned that § 1512(c)(1) would be rendered useless as § 
1519 applies to “any matter within the jurisdiction . . . of the United States . . . or in relation to . . . 
any such matter,” which overlaps with § 1512(c)(1) because it is likewise applicable in “an offi-
cial proceeding.”  Id.  The Court further noted that a broad interpretation of § 1519 would also 
render 18 U.S.C. 2232(a) useless.  Id. at 1085 n.6. 
 197.  Id. at 1085. 
 198.  See text accompanying supra notes 65–66. 
 199.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085 (plurality opinion). 
 200.  Id.  The Court also noted that it should avoid giving a word a meaning that is “so broad 
that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words [that it] giv[es] unintended breadth to Acts of 
Congress.”  Id. (first quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); then citing Unit-
ed States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008)). 
 201.  Id. at 1086 (plurality opinion).  The Court also noted that the absence of “falsifies” and 
“makes a false entry in,” in the similar provision, § 1512(c)(1), indicates that the framers inten-
tionally included those verbs in § 1519 to give it a narrower scope.  Id.  
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that Congress did not intend “tangible object” to encompass any physical 
object because any physical object would logically include a “record” or 
“document,” rendering “record” and “document” “surplusage.”202 
Finally, the Court noted that if any doubt remained as to what “tangi-
ble object” meant, it would turn to the rule of lenity, which provides that if 
a criminal statute’s language is so ambiguous that a logical interpretation 
cannot be discerned, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defend-
ant.203  The Yates Court explained that the rule of lenity is a valuable doc-
trine because it compels Congress to compose clear statutes that provide cit-
izens with fair warning of criminally culpable conduct.204  It reasoned that 
the rule of lenity, in this instance, was particularly important because Sec-
tion 1519 imposed a severe penalty of up to twenty years in confinement.205  
The Court determined that before imposing such a harsh penalty, it must re-
quire that Congress speak in “clear and definite language”; thus, if Section 
1519’s ambiguity could not be resolved, the rule of lenity would be in-
voked.206 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito agreed with the plurality’s judgment, 
but departed from its reasoning because he believes that the “case [can] and 
should be resolved on narrow grounds.”207  Unlike the plurality, Justice 
Alito limited his analysis to a discussion of Section 1519’s (1) list of nouns, 
(2) list of verbs, and (3) title, noting that that these three features taken to-
gether were enough to resolve the provision’s ambiguity.208  Similar to the 
plurality, Justice Alito applied the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem 
generis while analyzing Section 1519’s list of verbs and nouns.209  He rea-
soned that by including the terms “records” and “documents” in Section 
1519, Congress intended for “tangible object” to reference items similar to 
“records” or “documents,” which fish are not.210  He also reasoned that Sec-
tion 1519’s verbs, specifically “makes a false entry in,” indicated that Con-
gress meant for “tangible object” to reference a “category of nouns” associ-
ated with “filekeeping,” that is, things like e-mails and hard drives.211  
Justice Alito explained that this was because only items associated with 
filekeeping could logically retain a false entry, and therefore come within 
                                                          
 202.  Id. at 1086–87; see also supra Part II.D.   
 203.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088.  
 204.  Id.  
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id.  The Court did not apply the rule of lenity in this instance, but merely discussed its 
applicability.  Id.   
 207.  Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original).   
 208.  Id.  Justice Alito emphasized that the list of nouns, verbs, and title, are indicative of con-
gressional intent when taken together, not in isolation.  Id.  
 209.  Id. at 1089–90. 
 210.  Id.  Justice Alito referred to e-mails or hard drives as examples of objects that would read 
naturally as a tangible object that was similar in nature to a record or document.  Id.  
 211.  Id. at 1090.  
 658 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:635 
the scope of Section 1519.212  Finally, he reasoned that the use of the term 
“record” in Section 1519’s title, “Destruction, alteration or falsification of 
records in Federal investigations and Bankruptcy,” “point[ed] to filekeep-
ing, not fish.”213 
In her dissent, Justice Kagan contended that “tangible object’s” plain 
meaning, and Section 1519’s context and legislative history indicate that the 
term should be construed broadly, meaning any physical object.214  She be-
gan by determining that the ordinary meaning of “tangible object,” “a dis-
crete thing that possesses a physical form,” unambiguously encompassed 
fish.215  Next, Justice Kagan addressed Section 1519’s context.  She agreed 
with the plurality’s position that a statute’s terms should not be analyzed in 
isolation, but argued that Section 1519’s context still supported the conclu-
sion that Congress intended Section 1519 to be construed broadly.216  She 
specifically noted that the inclusion of the word “any” in Section 1519, and 
the provision’s long list of verbs, “alters, destroys, mutilates . . .” denoted 
an “expansive meaning” that “covers the whole world of evidence-
tampering.”217  Justice Kagan also reasoned that Section 1519’s list of 
nouns were instructive.  She argued that they signified that Congress in-
tended Section 1519 apply broadly because other statutes containing the 
same nouns, such as Section 1512(c)(1), are “understood to embrace things 
of all kinds.”218 
The dissent further contended that Section 1519’s legislative history 
also supports a broad interpretation of the term “tangible object.”219  Justice 
Kagan specifically took issue with the plurality’s proposition that Section 
1519 should be narrowly construed because of its origins in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  Instead, she argued that Section 1519’s legislative history actu-
ally suggests it began as a separate bill, meaning its scope was not limited 
by the Act’s financial fraud origins.220  Justice Kagan also reasoned that, 
while the plurality was correct to note that Section 1519 may have been en-
acted to supplement Section 1512(b)(2), it incorrectly determined that Sec-
tion 1519 must be construed narrowly to successfully fulfill this purpose.221  
                                                          
 212.  Id. (noting that “‘makes a false entry in’—makes no sense outside of file keeping.  How 
does one make a false entry of a fish? . . . ‘[M]akes a false entry in’ is always inconsistent with the 
aquatic”).   
 213.  Id.  
 214.  Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas 
joined Justice Kagan in her dissent.  
 215.  Id. at 1091.   
 216.  Id. at 1092.   
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. at 1092–93.  Justice Kagan also noted that the broad application of “evidence tamper-
ing” in the Model Penal Code was likewise instructive.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 1093.  
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 1093. 
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The plurality explained that Section 1512(b)(2) only made it a crime to 
“‘persuad[e] another person’ to shred documents.”222  Therefore, Section 
1519 was created in order to close the gap, and make it a crime for persons 
to directly shred or destroy documents.223  However, Justice Kagan con-
tended that even if “tangible object” were construed to mean any physical 
object, the provision would still ensure that persons who directly destroy 
evidence receive punishment equal to those who order evidence de-
stroyed.224 
Justice Kagan continued by disputing the Court’s analysis of Section 
1519’s title, its placement in Chapter 73, the canon against surplusage, 
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, and its discussion of the rule of leni-
ty.  Justice Kagan reasoned that the Court erred in examining Section 
1519’s title initially because the Court should always analyze the text of a 
statute first, and consider a title only after its text had been examined.225  
Furthermore, Justice Kagan argued that the plurality erred by examining 
Section 1519’s title because a title is a synopsis of a statute, and does not 
accurately reflect congressional intent.226  Specifically, the dissent posited 
that Section 1519’s title omits keywords such as “mutilation, concealment, 
[and] covering up,” and therefore does not correctly represent the text or 
meaning of a provision.227  The dissent also argued that Section 1519’s po-
sition in Chapter 73 of Title 18 has no bearing on the statute’s construc-
tion.228  Justice Kagan reasoned that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is simply or-
dered chronologically—meaning the legislature did not make a calculated 
decision regarding its organizational structure—therefore Section 1519’s 
position was not instructive.229 
Justice Kagan also took issue with the Court’s analysis under the can-
on against surplusage.230  While she acknowledged that Section 1519 and 
Section 1512(c)(1) “significantly overlap,” Justice Kagan argued they do 
not always overlap.231  She explained that Section 1519 applies to “‘mat-
ter[s] within the jurisdiction of any [federal] department or agency,’”232 
while Section 1512(c)(1) comparatively “safeguards ‘official proceed-
                                                          
 222.  Id. at 1081 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2) 
(2012)). 
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id. at 1093 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14 (2002)). 
 225.  Id.; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 226.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1094.  
 227.  Id.  Specifically, the dissent argued that the plurality’s analysis is flawed because a title is 
only an “abridgement” of the statute, and thus not indicative of its full purpose.  Id.  
 228.  Id. at 1095. 
 229.  Id.  
 230.  Id.  
 231.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 232.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
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ing[s].’”233  Therefore, the provisions apply in different instances, and so 
the canon against surplusage is inapplicable.234  Moreover, she contended 
that the legislative history illustrates that Congress was aware of the poten-
tial for overlap when the statutes were created, but enacted them regard-
less.235  Consequently, this demonstrated that the legislature did not believe 
the overlap created a surplusage issue.236 
Justice Kagan further argued that the plurality improperly utilized the 
canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.237  She contended that the 
canons should only be used to remedy ambiguity if a term is actually am-
biguous.238  Therefore, seeing as the meaning of “tangible object” is unam-
biguous, the canons should not be utilized to alter that definition.239  Never-
theless, she contended that an analysis under the canons, if done properly, 
still illustrates that “tangible object” should be construed broadly.240  She 
reasoned that the canons show that Section 1519’s purpose is to prevent the 
obstruction of law enforcement investigations by prohibiting the destruction 
of items that provide evidence.241  Therefore, Justice Kagan asserted that a 
broad construction of “tangible object” comports with this function given 
that any physical object with evidentiary value would hinder the “admin-
istration of justice” if destroyed.242  Finally, the dissent challenged the 
Court’s discussion of the rule of lenity, contending that the rule should be 
used only in instances of grave ambiguity, but where the term’s definition is 
clear, as in Section 1519, there is no need.243 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “tangible ob-
ject,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1519, refers only to objects capable of record-
ing or preserving information.244  The plurality’s judgment was correct due 
to its effective use of the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, and 
its accurate interpretation of Section 1519’s legislative history.  However, 
the Court’s reasoning was flawed because (1) its discussion of the canon 
                                                          
 233.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2012)).  As an example of an in-
stance where the provisions do not overlap, Justice Kagan noted that an FBI investigation would 
fall within the scope of § 1519 but not § 1512(c)(1).  Id.  
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Id. at 1096. 
 236.  Id.  
 237.  Id. at 1097. 
 238.  Id.  
 239.  Id.  
 240.  Id. at 1097–98. 
 241.  Id.  
 242.  Id.  
 243.  Id. at 1098–99. 
 244.  Id. at 1079 (plurality opinion). 
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against surplusage improperly focused on Section 1512(c)(1), and (2) be-
cause it erroneously examined the rule of lenity in order to opine on issues 
related to over-criminalization.245  Nevertheless, the Yates Court’s reason-
ing correctly implied that Section 1519 is only applicable in financial fraud 
cases, providing lower courts with instructive guidelines that could help 
prevent any future improper application of Section 1519 in cases that do not 
involve corporate fraud.246 
A.  The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because It Properly Discerned 
Congressional Intent with Regard to Section 1519’s Function by 
Examining Its Context and Legislative History 
The Yates Court correctly held that “tangible object,” as used in Sec-
tion 1519, denotes only objects that are capable of recording or preserving 
information.247  The Court came to this precise conclusion because it (1) ac-
curately examined Section 1519’s context by proficiently applying the can-
ons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, and (2) properly discerned con-
gressional intent regarding Section 1519’s scope by correctly interpreting 
the legislative history of Section 1519 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.248  Part 
IV.A.1 discusses the Court’s correct application of the canons noscitur a 
sociis and ejusdem generis.  Part IV.A.2 discusses why its interpretation of 
legislative history is accurate. 
1.  The Court Accurately Reasoned That the Term “Tangible 
Object” Does Not Encompass Fish by Applying the Canons of 
Construction Noscitur a Sociis and Ejusdem Generis 
The Yates Court correctly reasoned that “tangible object” referred only 
to objects that could “record or preserve information,” in part, by utilizing 
two canons of statutory interpretation.249  First, the Court applied noscitur a 
sociis, which means, “a word is known by the company it keeps.”250  Sec-
ond, the Court applied ejusdem generis, which counsels that “[w]here gen-
eral words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general 
words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects similar in nature.”251  
The Court applied these canons in order to analyze Section 1519’s lists of 
                                                          
 245.  See infra Part IV.A–IV.B. 
 246.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 247.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079. 
 248.  See supra Part III. 
 249.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085–86. 
 250.  Id. at 1085.  
 251.  Id. at 1086 (alteration in original) (citing Wash. State Dep’t of Social and Health Servs. v. 
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003)). 
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verbs and nouns.252  Specifically, the Court reasoned that (1) by adding the 
verbs “falsifies, or makes a false entry in” Congress intended for “tangible 
object” to refer to items that could be falsified or retain a false entry, and (2) 
by adding “records” and “documents” Congress intended to define a specif-
ic subset of objects that could all “record or preserve information.”253  Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that if Congress intended Section 1519 to be con-
strued broadly, it could have easily omitted these terms and simply enacted 
a statute that read “whoever . . . destroys . . . any . . . object,” but it did 
not.254 
As a result of this analysis, the Court correctly concluded that the addi-
tion of the verbs and nouns in Section 1519 was a calculated decision made 
by Congress in order to limit the meaning of “tangible object.”255  In doing 
so, the Yates Court appropriately gleaned legislative intent from Congress’s 
purposeful textual choices as the Supreme Court has done before.256  Fur-
thermore, the plurality’s application of the canons is proper given that the 
Court has consistently noted that the canons are best used to narrow a 
term’s meaning, as the plurality did in this instance, in order to avoid “giv-
ing [] unintended breadth to acts of Congress.”257 
Even though the plurality correctly applied the canons, Justice Alito, in 
his concurring opinion, utilized them in a more practical and effective man-
ner.258  By applying the canons, Justice Alito came to the same conclusion 
as the plurality, that is, “tangible object” should be construed narrowly.259  
                                                          
 252.  Id.  The list of nouns at issue being “record, document, or other tangible object,” and the 
list of actions being “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false 
entry in.”  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 1085–86 (plurality opinion). 
 254.  Id. at 1086–87. 
 255.  Id.  But see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 909 
(3d ed. 2004) (noting that a person can almost always find two conflicting canons of construction 
related to one point). 
 256.  See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) (noting that if Congress intended 
for 18 U.S.C. § 824(e)(2)(B)(ii) to be construed broadly, then it would not have included specific 
examples of crimes that fell within the provision’s scope including burglary, arson, and extortion); 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172–73 (2001) (reasoning that a federal habeas corpus petition 
was not within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) because Congress purposefully chose the word 
“state,” not “federal,” to modify “post conviction and other collateral review” within the statute). 
 257.  Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (citing e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 
U.S. 704, 708–09 (1877)); see also Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2201–02 (2013) (reason-
ing, under the canon noscitur a sociis, that the phrase “in connection with” as used in the Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 should be narrowly construed due to specific examples of the 
term’s meaning provided in a supplementary section); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
294 (2008) (reasoning that the meanings of “promotes” and “presents” within 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(3)(b) are narrowed according to the canon noscitur a sociis because of the verbs 
which surround them).  
 258.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 259.  Id.  
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However, instead of merely defining “tangible object” as the plurality did, 
Justice Alito more expansively concluded that the focus of Section 1519 
was meant to be on “filekeeping.”260  From this conclusion, he logically de-
termined that a fish is not an item that is associated with “filekeeping,” and 
therefore destroying a fish cannot be prohibited by Section 1519.261  Justice 
Alito’s application of the canons is more effective than the plurality’s in 
two ways.  First, he appeals to common sense, making his opinion more 
persuasive and credible.  For example, while reasoning that the term “tangi-
ble object” should refer to objects that are similar to “records” and “docu-
ments” under noscitur a sociis.  Justice Alito contended that a fish would 
not “spring to mind” as such an object, and further questioned “[w]ho 
wouldn’t raise an eyebrow if a neighbor, when asked to identify something 
similar to a ‘record’ or ‘document,’ said ‘crocodile’?”262 Second, Justice 
Alito provides and explains several real-world examples of items that would 
come to mind when imagining a “tangible object” in the context of “file-
keeping.”263   By doing so, he demonstrates how his reasoning may be prac-
tically applied, which makes his opinion more germane and therefore deci-
sive.  In addition to applying the canons more effectively than the plurality, 
Justice Alito also rightly omitted any discussion of the rule of lenity and the 
canon against surplusage from his opinion.264  Why did he omit these com-
ponents when the plurality did not?  It could be that Justice Alito’s profi-
cient application of the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis facili-
tated this narrowed, more appropriate, reasoning.  His persuasive analysis 
of the canons might have been evidence enough—in his mind—that the 
term “tangible object” did not encompass fish.265  Consequently, Justice 
Alito could have determined that he did not need to implement other tools 
of statutory interpretation to support his conclusion. 
                                                          
 260.  Id. at 1079 (plurality opinion) (defining “tangible object” as an object that could “record 
or preserve information). 
 261.  Id. at 1089–90 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 262.  Id.  Additionally, while analyzing Section 1519’s verbs, Justice Alito appeals to common 
sense when he explains that the verb “makes a false entry in” would “make no sense out of file-
keeping.  How does one make a false entry of a fish?”  Id. at 1090. 
 263.  Id. at 1089–90.  Justice Alito notes that e-mails, hard drives, and other items included in 
various dictionary definitions of tangible object would fall within the meaning of “tangible object” 
as used in Section 1519.  Id.  
 264.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 265.  Compare supra Part II.A.1, with Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1089–90 (Alito, J., concurring).  Jus-
tice Alito’s approach is similar to the Court’s traditional plain meaning approach.  In using this 
approach, the Court typically refuses to employ other mechanisms of statutory interpretation once 
it determines that plain meaning is clear and lends itself to one, logical interpretation of a statute.  
Here, it might be said that Justice Alito determined that the canons, along with a brief discussion 
of Section 1519’s title, were evidence enough that “tangible object” should be construed narrowly.  
Thus, he refused to apply other tools of statutory interpretation.  Id.  
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2.  The Court Properly Employed Legislative History to Construe 
Section 1519 in a Manner That Maintained the Purpose of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Yates Court correctly determined that the impetus behind the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act—the Enron scandal—demonstrated that the Act’s purpose 
was to further prevent and punish financial fraud.266  The Court also accu-
rately reasoned that, by enacting Section 1519 as a provision of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, Congress intended that it carry out the Act’s purpose.267  
In light of this reasoning, the Court determined that Section 1519 could not 
be construed broadly as a general evidence tampering statute because that 
would ultimately remove Section 1519 from its “financial fraud moor-
ing.”268  It appropriately concluded, instead, that Section 1519 had to be in-
terpreted narrowly—meaning “tangible object” could only reference objects 
that could “record or preserve information”—because only then could the 
provision target persons for destroying objects in cases of financial fraud 
and facilitate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s function.269  The Supreme Court has 
regularly followed the policy that when interpreting a provision, it should 
construe statutory language in a way that ensures a larger statutory scheme 
or purpose is upheld.270  Therefore, by interpreting “tangible object” in a 
manner that facilitates the successful operation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
                                                          
 266.  See supra Part III. 
 267.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1084 (plurality opinion); see also LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, 
EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE 332 (2010) (“[I]ntentionalism 
directs courts to ascertain statutory meaning by looking at ‘the legislatures original intent’ . . . 
courts should act as faithful agents of Congress because Congress is the primary lawmaker in a 
representative democracy.” (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 14 (1994)).  But compare KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 177–83 (1999) (identifying and expounding upon five catego-
ries of arguments against the use of legislative history in an analysis of statutory interpretation), 
with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 845, 846 (1992) (noting that the Court’s use of legislative history fluctuates over time de-
pending on the presiding Justices and historical context). 
 268.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079.   
 269.  Id.  The Yates plurality specifically noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “trained its atten-
tion on corporate and accounting deception and cover ups.”  Id.  But see ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29–31 (1997).  Justice Scalia 
expressly supports a view that legislative history should not be examined when construing statutes 
because the intent of the legislature is not the “proper criterion of law.”  Id. at 31. 
 270.  See Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267 (2014) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 
922(a) to maintain the statute’s larger purpose of regulating background checks amongst gun buy-
ers to prevent criminals from falsely purchasing guns); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 
709–10 (2000) (refusing to construe a statute in a manner that would be “fundamentally contrary” 
to the statute’s scheme).  But see Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 
(2015) (noting that in interpreting statutes, the Court must follow a provision’s text even if it 
would result in undermining a provision’s objective). 
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the Court upheld the Act’s purpose and adhered to traditional principles of 
interpretation.271 
B.  The Court Erroneously Utilized the Canon Against Surplusage and 
Inappropriately Applied the Rule of Lenity 
The Yates Court erred when it applied the canon against surplusage 
and discussed the rule of lenity, and should have omitted the analyses alto-
gether.272  First, the Yates Court erred when it argued that a broad interpre-
tation of “tangible object” in Section 1519 would render Section 1512(c)(1) 
superfluous according to the canon against surplusage.273  The Court should 
have noted, instead, that a broad interpretation of “tangible object” would 
render Section 2232(a) unnecessary.  In addition, the Court inappropriately 
included a discussion of the rule of lenity in order to expound upon its own 
policy values pertaining to over-criminalization.274  Part IV.B.1 discusses 
the Court’s source of error in applying the canon against surplusage, and 
Part IV.B.2 discusses the Court’s improper application of the rule of lenity. 
1.  The Court Should Have Applied the Canon Against Surplusage 
to Section 2232(a) Instead of Section 1512(c)(1) 
The Yates Court held that “tangible object” referred only to objects 
that could be used to “record or preserve information,” in part, based on its 
canon against surplusage analysis.275  This analysis, however, was misdi-
rected.  The Court correctly reasoned that a broad interpretation of “tangible 
object” would render certain provisions superfluous, but improperly deter-
mined that it was the impact on Section 1512(c)(1) that was the crux of the 
issue.276  The Court concluded that Section 1512(c)(1) would be rendered 
superfluous if “tangible object” were read to include any physical object 
because “[v]irtually any act that would violate [Section] 1512(c)(1) no 
                                                          
 271.  See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195–96, 215–16 (1983) (noting (1) the Supreme 
Court’s increased use of legislative history to clarify the meaning of statutory language, (2) how 
the “plain meaning rule” has been laid to rest, and (3) how the Court implements tools of statutory 
construction as needed); see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpret-
ing Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861 (1992) (noting that legislative history is a useful sup-
plement to help interpret unclear statutory language in order to “(1) avoi[d] an absurd result; (2) 
preven[t] the law from turning on a drafting error; (3) understand[] the meaning of specialized 
terms; (4) understand[] the ‘reasonable purpose’ a provision might serve; and (5) choos[e] among 
several possible ‘reasonable purposes’ for language in a politically controversial law”).  
 272.  See supra Part III. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
 276.  Id. at 1084–85. 
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doubt would violate [Section] 1519 as well.”277  The dissent, nonetheless, 
countered this reasoning with two meritorious arguments.278  First, the dis-
sent argued that Section 1512(c)(1) does not apply to the same instances as 
Section 1519.279  Justice Kagan contended that Section 1512(c)(1) applies 
to “official proceedings” as defined in Section 1515(a)(1)(A), while Section 
1519 applies to “matter[s] within the jurisdiction of any [federal] depart-
ment or agency.”280  Therefore, Section 1512(c)(1) would not be rendered 
superfluous.281 
Second, the dissent countered the plurality’s conclusion by discussing 
Section 1519’s legislative history.282  The plurality contended that the legis-
lative history shows Section 1512(c)(1) was “drafted and proposed after 
Section 1519.”283  Therefore, Congress would not have enacted Section 
1512(c)(1) after Section 1519 if Section 1519 already encompassed the 
same matters as 1512(c)(1).284  Comparatively, the dissent argued that the 
legislative history indicates that when the provisions were enacted “law-
makers knew that Section 1519 and Section 1512(c)(1) share[d] much 
common ground.”285  Justice Kagan posited that Congress anticipated Sec-
tion 1512(c)(1) and Section 1519 might overlap and apply to the same acts, 
but still enacted both provisions because it believed the overlap was insig-
nificant; therefore, the canon did not apply.286 
                                                          
 277.  Id.  But see Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 88–89 (2001) (construing 25 
U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1) narrowly, despite the fact that the Court’s interpretation rendered part of the 
statute superfluous, because there was no other reasonable interpretation). 
 278.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1095–96 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 279.  Id.; see also supra note 70. 
 280.  Yates, 135 S. Ct at 1095–96. 
 281.  See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013) (noting that the “canon 
against surplusage is not an absolute rule”); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253 (1992) (noting that redundancy across statutes is not unusual and the Court must give mean-
ing to both provisions unless an interpretation would render a section entirely superfluous); see 
also J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001) (reasoning that the 
canon against surplusage need only be used when two statutes clearly “cannot mutually coexist,” 
and because the Plant Patent Act and Plant Variety Protection Act merely overlap, the Court can 
still construe the Plant Protection Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101, to ascribe meaning to each (quoting 
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976))).  
 282.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1095. 
 283.  Id. at 1084 (emphasis added) (plurality opinion). 
 284.  Id. at 1084–85. 
 285.  Id. at 1096 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 286.  Id.; see 148 CONG. REC. 12,512, 12,513 (2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“[I]n at least one 
area they overlap in what they propose . . . .  But I don’t see there are major problems.”); see also 
S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 27 (2002) (noting that even though § 1519 applied to matters that other 
obstruction of justice statutes already encompassed, the framers enacted it because the provision 
uniquely omitted any requirement that the obstructive conduct relate to a “pending or imminent 
proceeding matter”). 
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Overall, it seems the legislative history is inconclusive because it can 
be construed to support both the plurality’s and the dissent’s opinion.287  
Therefore, the Court should have either expounded on its alternative argu-
ment—that if “tangible object” were construed as applying to any physical 
object it would render Section 2232(a) superfluous—or omitted the analysis 
altogether.288  Section 2232(a) prohibits persons from “destroy[ing] . . . or 
otherwise tak[ing] any action, for the purposes of preventing or impairing 
the Government’s lawful authority to take such property.”289  The Yates 
Court could have contended that Section 2232(a) would be rendered super-
fluous if Section 1519 were construed broadly because then “tangible ob-
ject” might cover the same group of items that the term “property” would 
cover in Section 2232(a).  It could have also alternatively argued that if Sec-
tion 1519 were construed narrowly, “tangible object” would focus on issues 
separate from those covered by the term “property” in Section 2232(a).  
Whether this argument would be successful is unclear.  However, it is clear 
that Section 2232(a)’s legislative history would be easier to interpret be-
cause it does not overlap with Section 1519’s legislative history.  Unlike 
Section 1512(c)(1), Section 2232(a) was unquestionably enacted before 
Section 1519, and separate from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Therefore, an ar-
gument based on Section 2232(a) would, in the least, be stronger than one 
based on Section 1512(c)(1). 
2.  The Court Erred in Applying the Rule of Lenity 
After the Court concluded its statutory interpretation analysis, it rea-
soned that if any doubt was left regarding the scope of “tangible object” in 
Section 1519, then the rule of lenity might apply.290  The Court noted that 
the rule of lenity, which counsels that any ambiguity in a criminal statute 
must be resolved in favor of the defendant, was particularly appropriate in 
this case because persons who violate Section 1519 could be subject to 
twenty years in prison.291  However, many courts have held that the rule of 
                                                          
 287.  See Breyer, supra note 267 (noting that it is easy to find examples of vague or conflicting 
legislative history); see also Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 539 (2004) (finding that the legisla-
tive history “creates more confusion than clarity about the congressional intent”). 
 288.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085 n.6 (plurality opinion). 
 289.  18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 290.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088. 
 291.  Id.  The Court explained that “before we choose the harsher alternative,” it is prudent “to 
require that Congress . . . sp[eak] in language that is clear and definite.”  Id.; see also Lander v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958) (noting that “the Court will not” increase criminal penal-
ties when a statute’s language is ambiguous).  But see Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1100–01 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that § 1519’s broad reach does not mean it is ambiguous, that the twenty year 
punishment is § 1519’s maximum, and that even though the statute is “too broad and undifferenti-
ated . . . .  [T]his Court does not get to re-write the law” because “‘[r]esolution . . . of whether a 
statute should sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress’” (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 466 
U.S. 475, 484 (1984))). 
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lenity only applies after a court has exhausted every tool of statutory inter-
pretation, and concluded that it cannot even suppose what Congress intend-
ed the statute to mean.292  While the Yates Court initially found Section 
1519’s language ambiguous, it resolved that ambiguity by applying several 
tools of statutory interpretation, ultimately holding that a “tangible object” 
was one that could “record or preserve information.”293  Consequently, the 
Court’s discussion of the rule of lenity is out of place.294  Furthermore, 
through its discussion of the rule of lenity, the Court seemingly infers that 
“tangible object” should be construed narrowly to avoid the “absurd result” 
of subjecting persons to twenty years in prison for violating language that is 
extremely broad.295  As a result, it appears that one of the reasons why the 
plurality felt Section 1519 should be construed narrowly was based on its 
own desire to frame valuable policy decisions and prevent “over criminali-
zation and excessive punishment.”296  However, courts and commentators 
have long been cautious with regard to the Court’s attempts to “avoid ab-
surd results” because of the risk that a “‘remedial statute[]’ [will] be liberal-
ly construed to achieve [the Court’s] purposes,” and not Congress’s pur-
pose.297  It is the job of the judiciary to interpret a statute’s language and 
define its purpose within the parameters that the legislature intended.  It is 
                                                          
 292.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1098; see e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 
(1997) (noting the rule of lenity is applicable only in the face of “grievous ambiguity” (quoting 
Chapman v. United States 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991))).  But see Abramski v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 2259, 2281 (2014) (Scalia J., dissenting) (noting that the rule of lenity applies whenever a 
“reasonable doubt persists,” and the “tools” of statutory interpretation “do not decisively dispel the 
statute’s ambiguity” (first citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); then citing 
e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410 (2010) (emphasis added))).  
 293.  See supra Part III; compare Yates, 135 U.S. at 1088 (plurality opinion) (discussing the 
rule of lenity), with United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 56–57 (1994) (applying the rule of 
lenity because the language and context of 18 U.S.C. 3565(a) left it open to several different rea-
sonable interpretations).  
 294.  See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (noting that the rule of lenity “ap-
plies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ . . . we can make ‘no more 
than a guess as to what Congress intended’” (alteration in original) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 
U.S. 50, 65 (1995))). 
 295.  See Breyer, supra note 267 at 848 (noting that an absurd result occurs when “some col-
lateral matter arises out of the general words . . . and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges 
are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament” (quoting 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 90–91 (15th ed. 1809)); 
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088 (plurality opinion). 
 296.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1100 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 297.  SCALIA, supra note 269 (emphasis added); compare Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 
U.S. 564, 575–76 (1982) (reasoning that even though respondent might have been correct to argue 
that a literal interpretation of ch. 153 § 3, 38 Stat. 1164 would produce an absurd result, any “dis-
satisfaction with the result” is for Congress to deal with, not the Court (first citing Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 123–24 (1980); then citing Reiter v. Sono-
tone, 442 U.S. 330, 344–45 (1979))), with Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014) (noting 
that even though there may be a chance that construing the term “employee” within 18 U.S.C. § 
1514(a) to reference employees of contractors and subcontractors may lead to an absurd result, the 
danger is mostly hypothetical and does not warrant a narrower interpretation). 
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not within the Court’s power to make substantive changes to improve a 
statute as it sees fit and interfere with Congress’s job of legislating.298  The 
Yates Court should have reached its holding based on the statute’s language 
and its analysis of the tools of statutory interpretation, not a desire to mold 
Section 1519 to its own purpose. 
C.  The Court’s Reasoning Correctly Implied That Section 1519 Only 
Applies in Financial Fraud Cases, Which Set Forth Instructive 
Guidelines for Lower Courts 
The Yates Court properly held that “tangible object” referred only to 
objects that could be used to “record or preserve information,” but its rea-
soning also implied that Section 1519 is only applicable in financial fraud 
cases.299  The Yates Court was not presented with the question of Section 
1519’s general scope on review, and consequently did not rule on the issue.  
However, its analyses of the provision’s legislative history and context 
rightly imply that Section 1519’s applicability is limited to corporate fraud 
cases in three ways.300  First, given that Section 1519 originated as a provi-
sion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,301 the Court emphasized that the provision 
should only apply in financial fraud cases to maintain the Act’s purpose and 
“financial fraud mooring.”302  Second, because the Court explicitly noted 
that it “resist[s] . . . creating a coverall spoliation of evidence statute,” it 
may be deduced that the Court meant Section 1519 as a specific evidence 
tampering statute, mainly a specific financial fraud evidence tampering 
provision.303  Finally, by holding that “tangible object” should be construed 
narrowly, the Court seemingly implied that Section 1519 should be applied 
                                                          
 298.  See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (citing United States v. Granderson, 511 
U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 299.  See supra Part III. 
 300.  See Brief for Petitioner at i, United States v. Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451) 
(“The question presented here is: ‘Whether the ordinary or natural meaning of the phrase ‘tangible 
object’ . . . is a thing used to preserve information . . . .”); see also Brief for the United States at 
(I), United States v. Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451) (“The question presented is 
whether Section 1519’s reference to ‘any . . . tangible object’ encompasses ordinary physical evi-
dence . . . or is limited to ‘thing[s] used to preserve information’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Brief for Petitioner, at i, 8)). 
 301.  See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
prompted by the Enron Corporation’s accounting fraud, so Congress enacted it to prevent finan-
cial fraud).  
 302.  Id. at 1079–81.  But see United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 (D. Conn. 
2007) (noting that even if § 1519 was made to penalize persons who shredded financial docu-
ments, it “would not prevent the government from using it to prosecute the destruction of evidence 
in connection with the investigation of other crimes”). 
 303.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088. 
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narrowly because such a narrow category of “tangible objects” may not ra-
tionally apply in a general evidence-tampering statute.304 
The Yates Court’s implicit determination that Section 1519 is only 
germane in financial fraud cases may drastically impact lower courts that 
are presented with claims involving Section 1519 in the future.  While 
many courts have utilized Section 1519 in accordance with the Yates 
Court’s narrow construction of “tangible object,” they have also repeatedly 
applied the provision in instances that do not involve corporate fraud.305  In 
light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, it seems the lower courts’ applica-
tion of Section 1519 in non-financial fraud instances directly contradicts the 
provision’s context and legislative history, which supports a narrow inter-
pretation of Section 1519’s scope.306  Therefore, the Yates Court’s reason-
ing may (1) counsel lower courts faced with a determination of whether 
Section 1519 is being appropriately employed, (2) provide instructive 
guidelines that might direct them to remedy improper utilization of the pro-
vision, and (3) prevent courts from applying Section 1519 in cases not in-
volving corporate fraud altogether.  More importantly, the Yates Court’s 
decision may alert lower courts faced with cases involving Section 1519 
that they might need to carefully scrutinize, possibly sua sponte, whether 
the provision is being properly utilized.  However, whether lower courts 
will adhere to the Court’s implicit determination has yet to be revealed giv-
en that this reasoning is merely dicta.  Therefore, the Supreme Court could 
very well encounter a direct question on appeal regarding Section 1519’s 
scope in the future, and look back at the Yates Court’s reasoning to direct its 
judgment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Yates v. United States, the Court held that the term “tangible ob-
ject,” as used in Section 1519, encompasses only objects that can be used to 
“record or preserve information.”307  The Court came to this correct holding 
by accurately examining the provision’s legislative history, and by profi-
ciently applying the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.308  How-
ever, its reasoning was flawed in two respects.  First, the Court mistakenly 
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applied the canon against surplusage, arguing that Section 1512(c)(1) would 
be rendered superfluous instead of Section 2232(a).309  Second, it inappro-
priately applied the rule of lenity in order to expound upon its own desire to 
effectuate policy change.310  Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis did implicit-
ly establish that Section 1519 is only applicable in financial fraud cases.  In 
doing so, it provided lower courts with instructive guidelines that will hope-
fully prevent them from improperly applying Section 1519 to non-financial 
fraud cases in the future.311 
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